The volume published by Rosenberg & Sellier Consciousness, language, society collects the lessons of the American philosopher J. Searle at the High School of Philosophy of Turin . The text presents several points of interest both because it helps to know the developments of philosophical reflection of the author of Speech Acts - now focused on the social dimension and in particular on its ontology analyzed in terms of status functions related to those particular types of speech acts that are performative (Chapter 3) - is because it presents a serious proposal and attractive if consistent, regarding the location of consciousness and mind in the natural world dealing with the problem traditional mind / body and, above all, that intentionality (ch. 2). It is my opinion that the importance of the proposed Searle can be properly assessed only when compared to (being in dialectical relationship, so to speak) with the difficulties they face naturalized semantics for mental states (ie with different naturalistic account of intentionality). In this short paper I will focus mainly on a specific point (weak) of Searle's analysis, leaving on one side the strength of his work, the treatment of intentionality (along the lines of the theory of speech acts and their directions of adjustment).
a limit, or at least what I think such is the way it is resolved the traditional problem of mind / body (Chapter 1). Searle argues correctly that the consciousness (and mind) constitute a domain that is irreducible to any other matter, considered the most fundamental of realities (natural) (p. 23). At the same time this does not imply any ontological weirdness (like the Cartesian dualism). consciousness (and mind) is irreducible, causally works well (pp. 23 et seq.) Without violating the natural order, so to speak . How is this possible? It seems that Searle's assumptions must struggle with the problem of causal closure of the physical world (pp. 26-27): If the consciousness (and mind) is irreducible and acts causally, then the simple fact that I am typing the keys on my pc was not only a variety of causes, but also a cause of these non-physical (not natural). For I want to write an article, a paradigmatic case of mental act, and write it by typing keys. Now if the mind is a domain if here we have two cases of the same phenomenon, the decision to write the article and the physical and physiological processes, such as the secretion of acetylcholine (a neurotransmitter dear to Searle), which produce the type . But if the physiological processes are sufficient to explain all that to play the role of non-physical cause? This sounds like a fifth wheel. If, on the contrary, the physiological processes can not explain everything and you must refer to a mental, then you are faced with the question, unmanageable, on the way in which a physical cause can not act on physical elements ( the unsolved problem of Descartes ). The materialistic reductionism in its various forms with respect to mental el'epifenomenismo are motivated by the need to resolve this problem. Searle, however, believes that its assumptions do not necessarily involve the acceptance of dualism. The idea is that, although irreducible, consciousness (and mind) is made and caused (pp. 25 and 52) from neural processes. The same phenomenon can be described in two ways: a neurobiological and mental level, but you are not in the presence of two different facts (pp. 52-53). As the state tables of solid and liquid water are determined by their trace elements (without putting special ontological questions) so the mind is determined by elements and neurobiological processes. The problem is solved. But is it?
me it seems that some problems may arise with the way in which Searle explains the relationship between mental and neurobiological level: fact he argues that consciousness (and mind) are caused and made by neural processes. It seems to me that the two notions are not synonymous and, indeed, have implications very different.
A P.. 52, where Searle says that neurons excited 'cause and achieve "mental events, it appears on a diagram (later replaced by another, as we shall see), which should clarify the relations between the two levels of description and that can serve to clarify my difficulty:
As you can see, the arrows that go from the bottom up, from the neural level to the mental, Searle are accompanied by either the letters C / R stand for "cause" and "realize". The arrows going from left to right instead exemplify respectively the transition from one process to another neural physiological (lower) and a mental event, an intention in this case, a body movement (above). He then explains that this diagram could create some confusion, suggesting the misconception that there are two different causal chains at work resurrecting the dualism with all its problems, and for this reason, replacing it with one that follows.
Searle, then, reads as follows:
Consider therefore the whole system as consisting of neurons (or whatever entity is established by the minimum functional neurobiology, such as from neural maps), represented here by circles. The whole system is in the conscious state in the same way the water in a glass is in liquid form or the table is solid, and we can have a causal explanation for this state. The shaded area within the system is precisely the function of making the fact that the entire system to be conscious. (P. 53)
Before proceeding, I must emphasize one point, I will use it later, and that is this: whatever we refer to the diagram, it is clear that the shift over time from t 1 at 2 (in the second diagram, but the point is implicit in the first), from a mental state to another state of mind or body is accompanied by a movement (must be accompanied by - no mention in passing the modal themed issue) because it depends, according to Searle, a change to the underlying physiological and neural level. That brings us to my difficulties.
A) The causal relationship exists between two facts, two phenomena, but there Searle told us that we are dealing with a single fact describe two different levels. How a possible causal relationship in this case (the arrows from bottom to top indicate a causal relationship)? The same issue is raised by Searle (pp. 544-45 in S. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the philosophy of mind , Blackwell, 1994) but responds by saying that this is actually quite common in nature Liquidity refers to the water and so on. Now the question is not whether or not the phenomenon is common, but how we must conceive and explain (that is, the problem concerns the liquidity of water and possibly how this is related to its micro-nutrients). B) The causal relationship also implies that between cause and effect are separated by a period of time. But if the cause neurons consciousness and the mind, then there will be a delay (systematic) between each other (a similar observation, but in relation to a totally different context, is made by Jaegwon Kim in Supervenience and mind, Cambridge University Press, 1993). Once again: how can you then support that there is only one phenomenon at work here? Finally, there should be a synchronization problem, as it were, between the two levels, with repercussions in the explanation of the behavior of the subject where is it?
say, however, that neurons produce mental consciousness and I think that goes in a completely different direction with respect to causation, perhaps in the right direction, but, however, incompatible with causality. Which is why you can not combine the two reports as does Searle. If I understand correctly, is like saying that consciousness and the mind are made neurons, although it is possible to distinguish different levels of description of them and their behavior . If there is a shift to the level below (consider the two diagrams), then it is evaluated (to verify) a change in senior management, the mental. A case similar to this (and the liquidity of water) I think that moral properties, moral facts. X v Y the gun-hating strongly and fired, killing him. The same fact can be described at different levels: physical, ballistic; but at this level there is no trace of the murder seen as moral fact. And moral describe X as a murderess deserves punishment, the action on his part as highly reprehensible, and so on. without thereby implying that moral properties are ontologically dropped from the natural aspects of the same situation. To explain the relationship between the two areas and neutralize ontological concerns some philosophers use the notion of occurrence (See in this regard the already mentioned J. Kim, Supervenience and Mind ). In an informal and concise report that says that the same circumstances (not moral) should achieve the same moral properties (and therefore moral judgments). If the circumstances I have described above constitute a murder, then any other similar circumstance, no matter who is involved X and Y, is a case of murder (note that this is not the moral requirement that such cases must be tried in a similar, although obviously related). (A detailed analysis would require reference to other issues, such as modal and distinctions, such as the occurrence of weak and strong etc.. but here is enough what we just said.) Why is the ontological supervenience neutralizes any concern? In the first instance, the occurrence provides simply the covariance events: if something changes at the level not moral, then the changes made moral properties. But if there is covariance (and here the issue would come into play mode), then the report shall also include the dependence (ontological) whether or supervening properties (in our case, moral) from its base. If when there is no basis or it changes, there is not even the supervening fact, then it depends on the first, but not causally - not least because there is no lag here (the murder of my example is the simultaneous - because is the same thing of - the fact that X shot Y hating etc.).
Now, if the realization mentioned by Searle is the same as the report of occurrence, and from what we saw above, there should be little doubt, then, is clear that it is incompatible with causality (that can not be said that the neurons " cause and realize" the conscience). If we conceive of the relationship between consciousness (and mind) in terms of occurrence or realization, in fact, that the same event is subject to two different descriptions do not create any difficulties. also because the occurrence does not imply any temporal gap between the base and the fact arise. In conclusion it only remains to ask why Searle has put together two very different things and why he picked this realization. And the question is particularly relevant when considering what to say in other places in the text about the development of those mental states that are the intentions (chapter 2 p. 91).
